55 points michaelsbradley 3 hours ago 49 comments
dieseltech 2 hours ago | parent
Then instantly gives you a shell script that it pipes to `sudo bash`. The irony isn't lost here.
Carrok 2 hours ago | parent
Such a tired trope. If you want to do it the hard way, you are welcome to build by hand https://github.com/PDG-Global/rVPN-core#building
hirako2000 2 hours ago | parent
tptacek 2 hours ago | parent
WireGuard by itself is not a stealth VPN, but the things that make a VPN "stealthy" are all things you'd layer on top of a WireGuard design, not thread through the middle of it. A datagram-based protocol can run under any obscured transport.
We did this at Fly.io when we discovered that, for one reason or another, 5% of our users simply couldn't reliably use UDP. It was a one-day project to run it under WebSockets instead, and that was before coding agents.
drum55 2 hours ago | parent
The parent is obviously just Claude making a fancy website and some sort of unreviewed networking protocol that's dressed up to look as if it's a real project. Github really needs to start showing commit cadence and repo birthdates.
joecool1029 2 hours ago | parent
netbird's a thing to check out if you want an alternative to tailscale you can self-host.
drum55 2 hours ago | parent
tamimio 1 hour ago | parent
tamimio 1 hour ago | parent
WhyNotHugo 2 hours ago | parent
Why TFA explains it, it's also in the title: "stealth". WireGuard is trivial to detect and block, and has no aspirations at being stealth.
ronsor 2 hours ago | parent
> WireGuard by itself is not a stealth VPN, but the things that make a VPN "stealthy" are all things you'd layer on top of a WireGuard design, not thread through the middle of it. A datagram-based protocol can run under any obscured transport.
UqWBcuFx6NV4r 1 hour ago | parent
nyeki 1 hour ago | parent
tptacek 1 hour ago | parent
aborsy 1 hour ago | parent
You want wireguard to be the software that takes the packets first.
tptacek 1 hour ago | parent
aboardRat4 58 minutes ago | parent
That's plain wrong. The first thing a normal wireguard faces is... the wild network of the Internet, with many servers and hordes of malicious agents. This is what makes is an "encrypted VPN", it's expected to withstand being transmitted by garbage media.
>potential for RCE before packets reach wireguard
There is no such thing as "rce packets". Moreover, every wireguard implementation has a different surface for RCEs (bugs), it's not a property of wireguard, it's a property of the implementation, of which there are at least three.
thadt 39 minutes ago | parent
I mean, that depends quite a bit on the code reading the packets, no?
My interpretation of OP is that they trust Wireguard’s code to be secure - random wrappers, somewhat less so.
aborsy 33 minutes ago | parent
With these wrappers, peers also run wrapper and unwrapper services, to encapsulate udp packets into websocket frames and vice versa. For example, the software that proceses incoming packets from the internet could be wstunnel listening on 443/TCP. This layer converts the websocket TCP traffic to wireguard UDP, which wireguard would then decrypt. Wireguard could even listen to local host.
However, those layers could be insecure, and may lead to code execution on server before wireguard is even involved.
tptacek 30 minutes ago | parent
Obviously, all software creates an opportunity for a bug, so even though this is pretty low-risk as attack surface goes, if you're making a choice between plain natural WireGuard and WireGuard wrapped in WebSockets, the "plain" version has marginally less attack surface.
But if your choice is between WireGuard wrapped in WebSockets or an entire new VPN protocol, clearly the new protocol drastically increases the attack surface.
In any case: wrapping WireGuard with something else does nothing at a design level to put WireGuard's security at risk. That's not how it works.
aborsy 20 minutes ago | parent
That's why wireguard over TCP is not as secure as wireguard UDP.
tptacek 13 minutes ago | parent
justsomehnguy 9 minutes ago | parent
Congratulations, DPI marked your connection as... WireGuard and blocked it.
I'd say you are now double safe - there is could be no RCE if there is no packets at all.
eric15342335 2 hours ago | parent
Sha1rholder 2 hours ago | parent
Hmm... It just ain't true.
---
For those who need a "stealth VPN", use <https://github.com/XTLS/Xray-core/> or its GUI version <https://github.com/2dust/v2rayN/>
TZubiri 37 minutes ago | parent
lxgr 2 hours ago | parent
> [...] verifies checksum [...]
Phew, good thing it verifies that, otherwise piping unverified output to a sudo shell could be dangerous!
therein 2 hours ago | parent
> Many flows. One connection shape
Shape, shape... shape.
I feel up until AI, nobody with their right mind would refer to the shape of a connection.
jmclnx 1 hour ago | parent
Not sure what this means. AFAIK all VPNs have end-to-end encryption. Stealth ? will need to read to see what that means.
tonymet 1 hour ago | parent
TZubiri 30 minutes ago | parent
The typical use case for this is usually malicious btw, and the means to do this are residential proxies, which again are usually maliciously obtained
tonymet 1 hour ago | parent
Does anyone have a guide on getting wireguard + stunnel set up to evade DPS firewalls?
munro 1 hour ago | parent
amir734jj 1 hour ago | parent
f311a 1 hour ago | parent
rock_artist 1 hour ago | parent
lifeisloving 1 hour ago | parent
petu 1 hour ago | parent
aboardRat4 54 minutes ago | parent
Not at all. China, Russia, and Iran are the three biggest markets for VPNs.
In China about 150 million people use a VPN, in Russia about 60 million, about half the population
gruez 53 minutes ago | parent
Like, it's a FBI honeypot or it's a CIA op to help dissidents?
prima-facie 47 minutes ago | parent
breakwaterlabs 26 minutes ago | parent
However, if someone claims (or as good as) that "encrypted over TLS on 443" intrinsically pos5esses this property, they demonstrate that they
• do not understand the state-of-the-art in L7 firewalls as of 2010, let alone today
• don't understand common enterprise and state-level controls like HTTPS decrypt (which instantly break this)
• haven't read any of the last decade of papers on detecting protocols like obfsproxy
• haven't even bothered to look at existing takes on this (like tor) and the compromises that they make
---
From the whitepaper:
> Desktop, CLI, and Android clients use BoringSSL to mimic a Chrome TLS 1.3 ClientHello fingerprint, helping evade deep-packet inspection.
Do you set an SNI / eSNI? No? Trivially detectable. I believe Palo Alto AppID would flag this instantly as non-HTTPS masqueraded traffic.
Go fire this up behind China's golden shield, and see how many minutes your tunnel stays performant before they tarpit you; then come write a whitepaper.